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Abstract. One of the main motivations for having a compositional semantics
is the account of the productivity of natural languages. Formal languages are
often part of the account of productivity, i.e., of how beings with finite capaci-
ties are able to produce and understand a potentially infinite number of sen-
tences, by offering a model of this process. This account of productivity con-
sists in the generation of proofs in a formal system, that is taken to represent
the way speakers grasp the meaning of an indefinite number of sentences. The
informational basis is restricted to what is represented in the lexicon. This
constraint is considered as a requirement for the account of productivity, or at
least of an important feature of productivity, namely, that we can grasp auto-
matically the meaning of a huge number of complex expressions, far beyond
what can be memorized. However, empirical results in psycholinguistics, and
especially particular patterns of ERP, show that the brain integrates informa-
tion of different sources very fast, without any felt effort on the part of the
speaker. This shows that formal procedures do not explain productivity. How-
ever, formal models are still useful in the account of how we get at the seman-
tic value of a complex expression, once we have the meanings of its parts,
even if there is no formal explanation of how we get at those meanings. A
practice-oriented view of modeling gives an adequate interpretation of this re-
sult:  formal compositional semantics may be a useful model for some ex-
planatory purposes concerning natural languages, without being a good model
for dealing with other explananda.
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1. Introduction 
The principle of compositionality (PC) can be presented roughly as follows: 
Principle of Compositionality:  the meaning of an expression is a function
of the meanings of its parts and of the way they are combined. 
As it is well known, PC is underspecified in many respects: it requires a specifica-
tion of what counts as a part, what is the syntax of the language and what is the rela-
tion “is a function of”. Moreover, PC is also part of distinct explanatory projects, from
the learnability of a language to the determination of the meaning of its complex ex-
pressions,  pointing at different  sources  of  evidence,  from psychology to intuitions
concerning the semantic value of linguistic expressions.1 A central  explanandum of
PC is productivity:
Productivity: PC explains how a potentially infinite output  can be generated
from a finite basis.
This is still underspecified: it may be used to explain the learnability of a language,
as it is the case famously in Davidson’s approach, or the capacity of a speaker to pro-
duce a potentially infinite number of sentences, or of an interpreter to understand also
indefinitely many sentences. I will be interested mainly in the capacity of understand-
ing. We should also take notice of the fact that, as it is also often remarked, it is not
necessary to postulate a potentially infinite output. The crucial point is that an inter-
preter cannot memorize the huge number of sentences she is able to grasp, their un-
derstanding has to be generated from a limited basis, through a limited number of
steps.
     It is clear that recursivity is at least part of the explanation of productivity: speak -
ers cannot memorize the meaning of each individual sentence they are able to under-
stand, they get at the intended reading by recursive operations on sub-sentential com-
ponents, as required by PC. We should ask however whether such operations can gen-
erate the intended reading of sentences, in other words, if the interpretation of  sen-
tences can be represented exclusively by syntatic operations on their sub-sentential
components. A compositional account of productivity is precisely the idea that the
reading of a sentence is generated exclusively by formal operations taking as input its
sub-sentential components and returning its intepretation. For Borg, for instance, this
account seems to be quite straightforward: 
First, I think a formal theory of meaning has a crucial role to play in explain-
ing how we can learn and understand a natural language. <…> The best ex-
planation for the generative nature of our linguistic understanding seems to
be that the meaning of complex wholes must be determined by the meanings
of their parts and their mode of composition. For if this is the case, then it is
no mystery why our understanding of complex linguistic items has an indefi-
nite range — for all we need to know are the meanings of a (finite) set of
primitives and recursively specified rules of composition operating on those
1 On the different interpretations of PC, see  [19], 153-156; see also [17], [18], [25].
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primitives. And this is what a formal theory tells us knowledge of meaning is
like: it's a recursively specified theory operating over a finite set of primi-
tives (roughly, words).2
This use of a formal system makes it a model of the process by which speakers
produce and understand complex expressions. The claim that only formal operations
on lexically encoded information can explain productivity has been an important ar-
gument in the opposition to contextualism in philosophy of language. Indeed, the con-
textualist claim that all sorts of information can have an effect on the understanding of
what is said by a given utterance runs counter to this explanation of productivity.  
     But are formal systems an appropriate tool to explain productivity? We have em -
pirical reasons to think that the mind integrates information from different sources in
processing sentences, and does it very fast and incrementally. For this reason, the for -
mal generation of proofs is not a good model to the way the speakers grasp a huge
number of sentences from a finite basis. That does not mean formal languages are not
good models for natural  languages  simpliciter:  they may serve certain explanatory
purposes, without being useful to other purposes of the theory. More precisely,  the
compositional account of productivity, that is, the generation of the intended reading
of sentences exclusively by formal operations of lexically encoded information is not
a good model to the way speakers get at the interpretation of sentences. 
 
2. Formal languages as models
At first, we may describe a formal language as a model by taking it to be a simplified
construct selecting features of a target system (a natural language) that are considered
to be relevant to the explanation of a certain behavior of this system (e.g., its produci-
tivity). The mere formal representation of a natural language by a formal language is
not enough to see how it provides this account.  In the formal theory, the intended
readings of sentences are generated as proofs in an axiomatic system. This formal way
to generate a potentially infinite output from a finite input is taken to be a model of
the way speakers do it.
     In order to see how this account works, let us we take a look at a particular prob-
lem for which compositional explanations have been suggested. Consider the sen-
tences:
i. John started a car
ii. John started a cigarette.
Aspectual verbs require the complement to denote an event, and therefore in (i), it
is said that John started the running of an engine, and in (ii), that he started to smoke a
cigarette. The meaning of the verb coerces its complement to have a particular mean-
ing in the sentence, distinct from the usual meaning of the word. At first, this seems to
2 [4], 56-57. To some, it seems to be the only possible account; see, e.g., [24], 7-8.
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be a problem for a compositional account, since the contributions of car and cigarette
to what is said by (i) and (ii) are not independent of the sentences in which they fig-
ure, and therefore they cannot provide an independent basis on which the composi-
tional process of understanding can build. 
    However, there are compositional ways to get the correct interpretation of the sen-
tences, by a process known as coercion. Coercion occurs when there is a mismatch
between the types of the words in a sentence. In Asher’s account, given a type mis-
match within a sentence, an accommodation process is triggered, changing the deno-
tation of the complement of the verb to an appropriate type, in this case, from an ob-
ject to an event. The accommodation of type presupposition takes place in the con-
struction of the logical form and is guided by information included in the lexicon. No
other information is needed, and recursive operations on lexically encoded informa-
tion leads to the appropriate interpretation of sentences, just as it is expected if PC is
to offer an account of productivity. The interpretation is then represented in a proof-
theoretic framework.3 
     Why should we want to build every information used in the interpretation of (i)
and (ii) into the lexicon?
Are such coercions really part of lexical semantics? That is, is it a defeasible
but a priori inference that if John started the car, John started the engine of
the car or that if Julie enjoyed the book, then (defeasibly) she enjoyed read-
ing it? Do such inferences follow solely from one’s linguistic mastery of the
language? Fodor and Lepore think that none of these inferences belong to
lexical semantics but are rather part of encyclopaedic or world knowledge.
However, most people can distinguish between  the largely automatic inter-
pretations that these predications seem to entail and those that require more
conscious effort. One might take that to be a mark of the information as be-
ing  present  even  during  predication  rather  than  inferred  afterwards  using
background, nonlinguistic beliefs.4 
The information used in the interpretation of (i) and (ii) has to be part of the lexical
semantics, and be treated compositionally, in order to explain the fluidity of their in-
terpretation. While this is not exactly the productivity  explanandum, that makes no
claim concerning the phenomenology of understanding, it is quite close to it: we want
to explain not only how speakers understand a huge number of sentences from a finite
basis, but how they do it without any conscious effort. Why only lexically based inter-
pretations can account for the automatic reading of sentences? Is it the case that any
information that is not encoded in the lexicon leads to a slow processing of sentences?
How do we know that?  
3 [3]
4 [3], 15. The other reason for a positive answer is simply that the formal system generates the
intended reading of sentences in which coercion occurs; of course, this result itself does not ex-
plain the phenomenology of interpretation.
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     Davidson has a rather direct explanation for the connection between productivity
and compositional semantics: only a compositional theory of meaning explains how
finite minds can understand an infinite number of sentences.5 How does it work? Ac-
cording  to  the  “Davidsonian  program,”  a  compositional  theory  of  meaning   puts
“someone who understands it in a position to understand any sentence of the language
for  which  it  is  a  theory.” 6 A theorist,  having  an  axiomatic  representation  of  the
meanings of terms of a given language, will be able to the generate the interpretation
of every sentence of this language in proof-theoretic way. However, the Davidsonian
approach  doesn't  address  directly  the  fluidity  of  interpretation.  Why  should  the
amount of effort demanded of the theorist be of any interest to explain the processing
of sentences? While it  may be true that,  for the theorist,  taking account  of world
knowledge slows the process of generating the interpretation of sentences, we have to
ask whether this also holds for subpersonal processes involved in our understanding
of language. 
We may consider that the automacity of the interpretation is accounted for by an
algorithm, that will take as input only lexically encoded information and deliver the
required  interpretation.  In  a sense,  the automaticity  of  interpretation  simply is  the
existence  of  such  an  algorithm,  and  Asher  gives  precisely an  algorithm  for  the
accomodation of types in the construction of the logical form of sentences, providing
thereby an account for the automaticity of the interpretation of (i)-(ii). However, the
mere  existence  of  an  algorithm does  not  assure  that  the  process  will  require  no
conscious effort  on the part of the interpreter. A more substantive claim is needed,
namely, that the formal approach mirrors what goes on in the mind of the interpreter,
as  she  grasps  a  sentence:  the  processing  of  sentences  implements  the  suggested
algorithm leading to the intended readings.7 This more substantive claim amounts to
viewing the algorithm used to produce the intended interpretation as a model for the
process  of  understanding  sentences  that  takes  place  in  the  mind  of  interpreters.
Asher’s theory for the coercion phenomenon may very well be a correct model for
coercion. However, I am interested in the general motivation of a formal theory as the
explanans of productivity. Asher wants to build every piece of information used in the
interpretation  in  the lexicon in order  to  explain  why it  is  felt  as  effortless  by the
interpreter, as opposed to the conscious effort demanded by the consideration of world
5 Although Davidson’s argument starts with learnability conditions, it deals mostly with the un-
derstanding of sentences. 
6 [16],  17-18. As Davidson himself puts it, “one natural condition to impose <on what it is to
know a language> is that we must be able to define a predicate of expressions, based solely on
their formal properties, that picks out the class of meaningful expressions (sentences), on the
assumption that  various psychological  variables  are  held constant.  This  predicate gives the
grammar of the language. Another, and more interesting, condition is that we must be able to
specify, in a way that depends effectively and solely on formal considerations, what every sen -
tence means.”  [5], 7-8.
7 I thank Antonio N. Coelho for the discussion of this point.
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knowledge.  The general  claim is  that  whenever  information  that  is  not  plausably
represented  as  lexical  information is  taken into account  in  the understanding of  a
sentence, the hearer feels the process of interpretation as demanding more effort.  We
should ask whether this a motivated claim.
3. Is there anything else in the target system?
It is clear that the account of productivity is at least partially compositional: there is a
recursive component in language that is part of the explanation of how we produce
and understand a potentially infinite number of sentences from a finite basis.  The
problem however is to know whether the interpretation of a sentence “depends effec-
tively and solely on formal considerations,” as Davidson puts it, or, as Ludwig and
Lepore say, “an axiomatic truth theory for a language of the right sort contains all the
information that we need to meet the goals of providing a compositional meaning the-
ory for a language.”  
   This constraint is independent of the Davidsonian take on the relation between a
theory of meaning for a language and productivity. It is also Asher’s  requirement,
grounded in the phenomenology of understanding: the use of any information not en-
coded in the lexicon will slow the process of interpretation. Also for him, the reading
of a sentence has to be generated formally, as a proof, that will take as input only what
is represented in the meanings of the terms, and return its logical form. The formal
procedure is a model for the automatic process of understanding. Here is a version of
this Automatic Interpretation (AI) requirement: 
(AI) The automatic interpretation of sentences is explained if, only if, their
understanding uses only information that it is plausibly encoded in the lexi-
con.
This is part of the formal account of productivity: only a formal procedure can ex-
plain the way we understand any, or at least many new sentences never encountered
before, without any conscious effort, from a finite basis, and this formal procedure
can take in only lexical information. Should we accept (AI)? 
    Before addressing this question, a couple of remarks. Firstly, the workings of the
mind are not transparent to the subject. It may be true that it is harder to a theorist to
take account of world knowledge, as compared to building proofs in an axiomatic sys-
tem, whether it is taken to represent the meanings of the terms of a sentence or not,
and the latter is an automatic process, while the former is not. But what goes on at a
personal level does not represent the way subpersonal processes deal with the same
kind of information. Moreover, the fact that a formal system is able to generate an in-
definite number of sentences from a finite basis is not in itself an explanation of the
way we, as speakers of a language, do it. As said above, a more substantive claim is
needed – and, in this case, it is a claim concerning the mechanism leading to a certain
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phenomenology of understanding, i.e., the opposition between the interpretation of
sentences felt as automatic and those demanding a conscious effort.
There are other routes to know what goes on in the mind of the speaker as she
grasps a sentence. An important kind of evidence that the mind uses different sources
of  information,  including  world  knowledge,  in  the  understanding  of  a  language,
comes from  psycholinguistics, in particular from two distinctive event-related poten-
tial (ERP) patterns measured in the processing of sentences. There is a negative de-
flection in the electrical activity in certain areas of the brain that peaks at around 400
ms after  the  onset  of  semantically  anomalous  words  (N400),  and  a  positive  peak
around 600 ms after the onset of words hard to integrate in the syntax of the sentence,
but also with the expected thematic role (P600). 
The N400 effect is particularly relevant here. It appears at the onset of the words in
italic:8
─ The Dutch trains are white...9
─ Every evening I drink some wine before I go to sleep.10 
─ I think that euthanasia is an acceptable course of action.11
─ The ham sandwich left without paying.12
In (iii), the effect is due to the background knowledge that Dutch trains are yellow.
Smaller, but clear N400 effects are elicited by (iv), when uttered by a child, and by
(v), when evaluated by someone who doesn’t think that euthanasia is an acceptable
course of action. Interestingly, (vi) does not lead to the N400 effect when said in a ap-
propriate context, but it takes place when uttered in an unfavorable setting. 
 In all those cases, the understanding taps into world knowledge, but doesn’t lead to
a conscious effort of interpretation. The same effect is elicited by the vision of incon-
grous pictures13  and in the integration of incongruous co-speech gestures.14 This is
also the case in coercion, that elicits an N400 effect. 15 The mere fact the N400 is iden-
tified doesn’t preclude a compositional account of coercion such as Asher’s. But, on
the one hand, an algorithm such as the one offered for (i)-(ii) doesn’t seem to be avail-
8 “The N400 was first described at the sentence level: in 1980, Kutas and Hillyard demonstrated
a more negative N400 to words that were semantically anomalous versus congruous with their
preceding sentence contexts, such as to the word “socks”, in the sentence, “He spread the warm
bread with socks.” <…>. The amplitude of the N400 was subsequently shown to be modulated
by a variety of factors other than frank semantic anomaly. <…> across sentences, van Berkum,
Hagoort and Brown demonstrated that words that are acceptable within a sentence, but incon-
gruous with their global discourse context, also evoke an N400 effect.” [11], 24.
9 [11] 
10 [22]
11 [23]
12 [20]
13 [11], 44.
14 [10]
15 [2]
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able for (iii)-(vi). On the other hand, if coercion doesn’t demand any conscious effort
and if its processing has the same pattern in the brain as the processing of (iii)-(vi),
which clearly includes world knowledge, then we have no reason to think that the
mere fact that world knowledge is needed to get at the intended reading will lead to a
harder path to interpretation as felt by the interpreter. 
    According to one interpretation, N400 and P600 combined show that the process of
understanding “engages at least two interactive but dissociable routes or streams to
comprehension,” a semantic-memory route, involving both stable and more contextu-
ally bound expectations, and a route sensitive to “morphosyntactic as well as to the-
matic–semantic  constraints.”  Neither  stream uses  only lexical  or  syntatic informa-
tion.16 While there is still lot of debate around these two effects, (AI) does not seem
well motivated: there is a fast integration of different sources of information in the in-
terpretation of sentences, that, from the phenomenological point of view, seem auto-
matic.  Although a formal system may generate an indefinite number of sentences
from a finite basis, which is one of the explananda of PC, it doesn't mirror the way we
do it. It is precisely at this juncture that a practice-oriented view of models opens up
new ways of seeing the relationship between formal theories and natural languages 
4. Another look at formal languages as models
It is not always clear what formal compositional accounts are supposed to explain.
Dowty, for instance, justifies the claim that the compositionality of natural languages
is “beyond any serious doubt” using arguments deriving from productivity.17 He is
certainly right in arguing for the compositionality of natural languages from the bal-
ance between finite storage and the grasping of a potential infinite number of sen-
tences, and also in thinking that the specific theory to be adopted is an empirical mat-
ter.18  But then he goes on to say that “ultimately the only empirical test of a model-
theoretic account of natural language semantics is the characterization of entailments
among sentences it gives.”19 Of course, we may also think there are empirical reasons
for accepting a specific theory for the way speakers of a language with finite capaci -
ties grasp a potentially infinite number of sentences other than the characteriztion of
entailment patterns – for instance, data coming from psycholinguistics. What is going
on here?
    Let us take a look at a couple of other semantic theories. In Jaszczolt’s Default Se-
mantics, PC holds at a level unifying different sources of information, that she calls
16 [10], 44. For a single-stream theory explanation of language processing accommodating these
effects, see [5].
17 [7], 23-24.
18 [7], 27-28.
19 [7], 40.
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the Principle of Compositionality for the Merger: 
    The meaning of the act of communication is a function of the meaning of the
words, the sentence structure, defaults, and conscious pragmatic inference 1.
20 There is
no formal derivation of the meaning of the merger. Default information, as well as
conscious pragmatic inference1 (i.e., pragmatic contributions to truth-conditional con-
tent),  are not incorporated in the merger by formally described mechanisms.21  
   This is also the case for some recent accommodations of contextualist examples in
formal versions of the Principle. In Recanati’s version, the contextualist PC reads:
I(a*b)c = f((g((I(a)c), (g(I(b)c)))
where g is a “pragmatic modulation function” made salient by the context:  
Thus understood, the formula says that the interpretation (content) of a com-
plex expression a*b is a function of the modulated meanings of its parts and
the way they are put together (and nothing else).22
The contextualist PC doesn’t say anything about the way we get at the modulated
meanings of subsentential components of sentences. This also holds for Dekker’s Live
Principle of Compositionality:
   The live meaning of a compound expression is a function of the live meanings of its
parts and their (live) mode of composition.23 A live interpretation “is one that inter-
locutors, and a suitably informed observer, can agree upon.”24 Dekker goes on to give
many of contextualists’ favorite cases as examples of live meanings. Again, there is
no formal way to get at the interpretation agreed upon by interlocutors.
    What is the point of having such a weak reading of PC? The reason is that it can ex-
plain systematicity, or at least some aspects of it. More precisely, PC has a role in ex-
plaining how we keep track of the intended interpretation in a given discourse.  In
Dekker’s example, although it is clear that in sentences like (vi), uttered in an appro-
priate context, ham sandwich refers to a person, not to a sandwich, the following sen-
tence is not a felicitous one:
ix. The ham sandwich wants to pay for it.
Likewise, even if we could back (vi) by an explanation such as
x. The ham sandwich is the person who ordered the/a ham sandwich,
(xi) does not seem to be a felicitous utterance:
xi. ? The ham sandwich is the person who ordered the/a ham sandwich.25
20 [14], 72.
21 “To repeat, although such merger representations are compositional, on the level of the infor-
mation pertaining to the particular sources no compositionality is expected. In other words, just
as linguistic semantics is not compositional, the meaning conveyed through cognitive or social–
cultural defaults, or through pragmatic inference, is not compositional either: compositionality
can be found at the level of their merger.” [14], 98.
22 [17], 189.
23 [6], 54.
24 [6], 54.
25 [6], 65-66.
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In all those cases, there is a compositional explanation of the semantic value of the
sentence, once we get at the intended readings of its parts, but no formal account of
how we get at those interpretations. In other words, there is no compositional account
of productivity. 
 There are at least two different sorts of explananda here. On the one hand, produc-
tivity, that is, an explanation of how speakers solve the balance between a small input
and a large output in the understanding and production of sentences. On the other
hand, how the semantic value of a complex expression depends on the value of its
parts and the way the are combined. This is what is aimed at by a semantics keeping
track of contextually modulated meanings of expressions, what seems to be a com-
mon thread in the theories mentioned above. According to Lasersohn, most semanti-
cists are not interested in modeling “what people do, on-line, in real time, as they are
speaking and listening”, but only in how “grammar assigns interpretations” – and, in-
deed, grammar does it compositionally.26  He is right in distinguishing these two prob-
lems, and I don’t have an assessment of what semanticists usually take themselves to
be doing. It’s clear, however, that Asher’s phenomenological motivation for building
compositional account  of  coercion only makes sense if  he takes  himself  to model
“what people do, on-line, in real time, as they are speaking and listening.” Moreover, I
am not sure that saying that “grammar assigns interpretations” compositionally is a
good description of the contextualist PC, as suggested by Recanati and Dekker, nor of
Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics. 
    Be that as it may, once we keep apart these two explananda, we can understand bet-
ter Dowty’s claim that “the only empirical test of a model-theoretic account of natural
language semantics is the characterization of entailments among sentences it gives”.
This is a plausible approach (at least  prima facie) to the semantic value of complex
expressions, but not a good way to ground empirical claims about productivity. We
can make sense of this double evaluation of PC if we see models as epistemic tools,
that may be put to different uses – as a matter of fact, many features of formal lan-
guages as modeling devices make more sense. To begin with, the manipulability con-
straint is something to be expected in the construction of models:
As epistemic tools models are constructed in the light of certain scientific
questions and they make insightful use of available representational means
and their characteristic affordances. From this perspective models function as
external tools for thinking, the construction and manipulation of which are
crucial to their epistemic functioning.27
We are  reminded,  of  course,  of  the  Davidsonian  idea  that  an axiomatic theory
should put  “someone who understands it in a position to understand any sentence of
the language for which it is a theory.” Notice however that, also for Asher’s proposal,
the compositional account follows this manipulability condition: we learn precisely
how to generate the reading of sentences using his formal system. 
26 [15]
27 [11], 263.
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Moreover, the fact that a model is an epistemic artifact, as Knuuttila also says, 
<...> implies first, that human agency, or rather traces of it, are more or less
manifestly present in it. Second, it implies that models are somehow materi-
alized inhabitants of the intersubjective field of human activity. Third, it im-
plies that models can function also as knowledge object.28
Formal languages are, of course, materalized inhabitants of our world that may be
the object of inquiry in  themselves. More importantly, insasmuch as we are interested
in models as representational devices, we should understand their relationship with
the world not as a two-place relationship, but as a more complex relationship involv-
ing the agent who uses models, roughly with the form:
S uses X to represent W for purposes P.29
Formal languages may be used to represent natural languages for certain purposes,
and not for others. This approach of modeling gives a better understanding of the way
formal languages can be part  of a  theory for  natural  languages.  Instead of  asking
whether natural languages have a compositional semantics or not, we should look for
different explanatory purposes for which a given formal model may be useful. 
5. Conclusion
Modeling the generation of the interpretation of sentences as a formal process is not a
good strategy, for the strict informational basis on which such models are built does
not represent  the larger pool of resources  used by human mind in processing sen-
tences. But formal modeling may be useful for other purposes, such as the explanation
of how of we keep track of different readings of a word accross sentences or within a
sentence, or, more generally, how the semantic value of a complex expression is ex-
plained, once we have the meanings of its parts, even if there is no formal explanation
of how we get at those meanings. The problem not in the use of formal models for
natural languages, but in having a too strict take on the relationship between models
and their targets, instead of a more open view of the modeling practice. There is no
simple answer as to whether language can be represented by a compositional mecha-
nism or not, we should ask rather which is the explanatory purpose of giving a certain
formal model for a given language. A practice-oriented view of modeling gives a bet-
ter perspective on the different uses of PC:  formal compositional semantics may be a
useful model for some explanatory purposes concerning natural languages, without
being a good model for dealing with other explananda.
28 [12], 1487.
29 [8] 743.
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